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In an early form the Act also granted the Commission control over the
issuance of securities113 - a power presumably essential to the improvement
of economic conditions within the industry. Deletion of this provision seems
especially regrettable in view of the recent Intercoastal Rate Structure Inves-
tigation which revealed serious imprudence in the financial management of
intercoastal carriers.114 Such financial abuses in parts of the industry might
well justify supervision, not only over the issuance of securities, but also over
the more detailed financial operations of the carriers.
Lack of control over private carriage and the great number of absolute
exemptions under the Act present the Commission with its two most im-
mediate regulatory problems. If the Commission fixes minimum rate levels
too high or by other means makes for-hire carriage too costly, large industrial
shippers may turn to private carriage; if the Commission's standards are
lax, private carriers and for-hire carriers specifically exempted by the Act
may be able to encroach upon the business of the regulated carriers. Either
result would jeopardize two of the policies Congress intended the Commis-
sion to effectuate: an adequate common carrier service and sound economic
conditions within the industry.
In the long run, however, the major task for the Commission will be the
reconciliation of the interests of the water carrier, the railroad, and the motor
carrier. Despite several omissions the new Transportation Act provides the
basic instruments with which to perform this task. The performance rests
with the Commission.
FEDERAL EMINENT DOMAIN POWER IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF WATER PROJECTS
FEDERAL control over the development and utilization of the nation's water
resources has grown substantially since the beginning of the conservation
movement in the first decade of the century. The principal economic motive
for this important assumption of responsibility lies in a long delayed recog-
nition that unified development of entire drainage basins is the only means
of effectively controlling and using the water within a river system., With
113. See Eastman, supra note 9, at 43.
114. See Commissioner Moran, dissenting in Intercoastal Rate Structure, 2 U. S.
M. C. 285, 311 (1940).
1. NAT. RES. CoMm., DRAINAGE BASIN PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS (1938); NAT.
RES. Comm., ENERGY RESOURCES AND NATIONAL POLICY (1939) 237-280; FED. EMERG.
ADM. OF PuBuc WORKS, REPORT OF THE 'MISSISSIPPI VALLEY CoMmiTTE (1934). For
a concise political history of navigation, flood control, and irrigation, see Fly, The Role
of the Federal Government in the Conservation and Utilizalion of Water Resources
(1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 274.
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development on such a large scale, it becomes necessary to make extensive
readjustments of land use and to relocate inhabitants in the river valleys.
It is the purpose of this Comment to consider the adequacy of the eminent
domain power of the Federal Government as a method of efficiently accom-
plishing these readjustments.
The effects of water control development on private land use in the river
valleys have been sufficiently extensive to give rise to a larger volume of
litigation than in any other field of federal eminent domain law. Sites for
dam structures constitute only a small part of the total land area to be retired
from private use. Waters impounded in large reservoirs may inundate several
hundred thousand acres,2 even requiring the relocation of town sites.3 "Pro-
tective strips" of dry land bordering the inundated tracts, and sometimes equal
to them in area, are acquired to prevent deterioration of the reservoir by the
accumulation of silt.4 Extensive areas, particularly in the lower Mississippi,
have been exposed to increased flood damage by the development of "flood-
ways." 5 In using this major engineering device for flood control, riverside
levees at particular points along the stream are lowered to allow the escape
of excess flood waters into designated valley lands; the waters are confined
in artificial channels by means of set-back levees and, after the flood sub-
sides, are returned to the main stream at downstream points. In the develop-
ment of river improvements for navigation and flood control, the construction
of dykes, levees, and revetments and the recoursing of channels by the
elimination of bends may permanently or during periods of high water
inundate large adjacent areas." Where lands are not actually inundated by
2. The Tennessee Valley Authority has acquired approximately 150,000 acres for
the Norris dam and reservoir project. It is estimated that the Kentucky Project, largest
of the TVA developments, will require the acquisition of 375,000 acres, necessitating the
removal of 3,500 families. 6 RE. TVA (1939) 7-22. See Crossman, Determining the
Purchase Boundaries and the Use of Reservoir Properties (1939) 15 Ec. GEo. 260; Gray,
Land Use Aspects of Reser-voir Problems (1939) 15 Ec. GEo. 238.
3. For cases upholding the power of the Federal Government to condemn land for
the relocation of towns threatened with inundation by a Government reservoir, see Brom
v. United States, 263 U. S. 78 (1923) ; United States v. Power County, 21 F. Supp. 634
(D. Idaho 1937). See also Small, River, Stay Away From My Door (Dec. 7, 1940)
SAT. EvE. POST 16.
4. See 6 RE. TVA (1939) 89-91.
5. See FED. EmERG. ADm-. OF PUBLIc VoRKs, REPORt OF THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY
COMMITTEE (1934) 195-212.
6. For descriptions of typical engineering activities of the Government frequently
resulting in property damage, see United States v. Sponenbarger, 303 U. S. 256 (1939)
(floodway development) ; John Horstman Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 138 (1921)
(irrigation project); Cubbins v. Mississippi River Comm., 241 U. S. 351 (1916); Hughes
v. United States, 230 U. S. 24 (1913) (levee construction); Franklin v. United States,
101 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) (navigation dyke); United States v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R., 90 F. (2d) 161 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 714 (1937) (dam
and reservoir).
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navigation or flood control or multiple-purpose projects, 7 changes in stream
behavior may so impair natural drainage as to require the substitution of arti-
ficial methods.
8
Inasmuch as the damage to land resulting from the development of water
projects ordinarily takes the form of overflow or inundation, the Government
rarely finds it necessary to oust the owner from possession and assume control
of the premises before beginning construction. Consequently, an aggrieved
owner can generally rely on the Government's instituting a condemnation suit
only in those cases where the liability of the United States is obvious. Even
then, actions to condemn follow only after unsuccessful negotiation for pur-
chase, or discovery of doubtful links in the chain of title.0 The major body
of eminent domain law relevant to water projects has therefore grown out
of another type of proceeding: the landowner's action against the United
States. As in the condemnation suit, the substantive right of recovery, where
one exists, has almost invariably been found in the provision of the Fifth
Amendment limiting the power of the Federal Government to take private
property for a public use without the payment of just compensation.1"
The constitutional prohibition embodied in the Fifth Amendment, however,
has by no means operated to insure landowners against all injuries to their
holdings sustained as a result of Government action. Two ancient legal
principles- only apparently unrelated- have combined to render the plain-
tiff's claim in an action against the Government highly uncertain. The first
of these, growing out of the primitive concept of property as the physical
object of ownership rather than as beneficial economic relations with others,
defines the "property" to be "taken," within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment, as the land itself.11 The second legal principle, derived from the medieval
maxim that "the King can do no wrong," holds the sovereign immune from
7. A "multiple purpose" dam and reservoir may operate to retard the water flow
for the reduction of flood levels, increase it for the maintenance of navigable channel
depths, concentrate it for the production of hydroelectric power, and accumulate it for
distribution into irrigation canals.
8. See, as a typical case, Lynn v. United States, 110 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 5th,
1940).
9. Out of 10,415 tracts of land acquired by the Tennessee Valley Authority in the
period 1933-39, only 6.91% were condemned because of refusal to sell. 6 Rr'. TVA
(1939) 114.
10. ". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U. S. CONST. AMEND. V. Congress may exercise the power of eminent domain in
conjunction with any of the enumerated powers. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367
(1875). For a history of the development of the constitutional doctrine defining the ex-
tent of federal power over water resources, see Fly, loc. cit. stepra note 1.
11. For an application of Hohfeld's distinction between "relational" and "physical"
concepts to the "property" concept in eminent domain cases, both state and federal, see
Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain (1931) 41 YAL E L. J. 221. See
also Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning
(1913) 23 YALE L. J. 16, 20.
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suit where its consent has not been given.' Out of these two principles have
emerged a series of doctrinal barriers to recovery rendering the suit against
the United States a grossly inadequate means of shifting the individual's loss
to the public.
The plaintiff's initial problem of invoking the jurisdiction of the court
depends on the applicability of the Tucker Act' 3 which authorizes suits against
the United States founded upon the Constitution. Under the apparently un-
necessary but well-established construction of the Act, the sovereign consents
to be sued only in cases "not sounding in tort."'14 Nevertheless, for the pur-
pose of clothing the action for injuries with at least the semblance of one in
contract, courts have asserted jurisdiction on the theory of a promise by the
United States "implied" by the Fifth Amendment. The juristic concept of
an implied promise to compensate has not been expanded, however, to permit
the claim in the absence of other vaguely defined "contractual" elements.
Not only must it be shown that the Government official taking the plaintiff's
property acted within the scope of his authority,' but a "consensual relation-
ship" between the plaintiff and the United States must be established. Thus,
the owner's consent, or at least his tacit acquiescence in the taking, is a pre-
requisite to recovery.' 0 The intention of the Government to appropriate the
property may be implied from the circumstances, but a denial of the intent
to pay17 or an assertion of title will leave the court without jurisdiction of
the cause.' s In Temple v. United Statcs,'9 for example, the plaintiff sought
recovery against the Government for dredging the shore line of his riparian
12. See Borchard, Govermnent Liability in Tort (1924) 34 Y.M L. J. 1, 129, 229.
13. 24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. §41 (20) (1934), 28 U. S. C. §250 (1) (1934).
The act confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts ". . . Concurrent with the
Court of Claims, of all claims not exceeding $10,000 founded upon the Constitution of the
United States or any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an executive department,
or upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government of the United States, or
for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect to which
claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States . . . if the United
States were suable." It confers similar jurisdiction on the Court of Claims, without the
limitation on the jurisdictional amount.
14. In the Act, as so construed, the phrase "in cases not sounding in tort" limits the
phrase "founded upon the Constitution of the United States." See United States v. North
American Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U. S. 330 (1920). But see concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Brown in United States v. Lynab, 188 U. S. 445, 474 (1903).
15. Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575 (1921) ; United States v. North Ameri-
can Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U. S. 330 (1920); Cartas v. United States, 250 U. S.
545 (1919); cf. Yearsley v. IV. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U. S. 18 (1940).
16. Jefferson Lime Co. v. United States, 48 Ct. Cl. 274 (1913) ; Bradford v. United
States, 47 Ct. Cl. 141 (1911).
17. Ball Engineering Co. v. J. G. Wite & Co., 250 U. S. 46 (1919); Harley v.
United States, 198 U. S. 229 (1905).
18. Hill v. United States, 149 U. S. 593 (1893); Langford v. United States, 101
U. S. 341 (1879).
19. 248 U. S. 121 (1918).
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lot. It appeared, however, that the Government was unaware that the plaintiff
owned the area because a lessee of the plaintiff, contrary to express directions,
had excavated and submerged that part of the land later dredged by the
Government. The Supreme Court held that the Government's claim to the
property right in question, at the time of the taking and during the suit,
prevented the lower court from rightfully assuming jurisdiction of the con-
troversy. The Court recognized that a "property right" of the plaintiff was
violated, if the claim of the Government was unfounded, but, paradoxically,
held that no procedural device for recovery was available. Apparently, the
incaution of the taking agency in ascertaining ownership provides the Govern-
ment with an effective means of escaping liability.
Where the elements of the controversy are sufficient for the court to make
out the artificial contractual relationship and thus assume jurisdiction, the
plaintiff has satisfied the initial requirement for recovery, but his cause may
nevertheless be defeated on substantive grounds. The argument frequently
invoked by the Government, that private property is subject to a "servitude" in
favor of the federal power over navigation, has been generally rejected by the
courts under the constitutional theory that the Fifth Amendment operates as a
limitation on all of the enumerated powers.20 But the servitude doctrine has
consistently been recognized as a barrier to recovery where the plaintiff is
one of the large group of owners whose holdings are located "in the bed of
the stream."' 21 The concept that plaintiff's title to the bed is qualified by a
servitude in favor of the federal power over navigation forecloses, of course,
any further issues as to whether his "property" has been "taken." ' 2 On the
basis of this doctrine, privately owned wharves, 23 bridges,2 4 and oyster beds2 5
have been damaged or destroyed without governmental liability. The defini-
20. But see the concurring opinion of Judge Simons in Franklin v. United States,
101 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
21. Legislation has been passed making it unlawful to construct bridges or other
structures across or in navigable streams until the consent of Congress and the approval
of the,Chief of Engineers and Secretary of War has been obtained. 30 STAT. 1151 (1899),
33 U. S. C. § 401 (1934). Alteration or removal may be required, however, whether or
not the permit or statute of consent reserves the power to make such requirements. IIan-
nibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194 (1911); Louisville Bridge Co. v. United
States, 242 U. S. 409 (1917). State legislation is also insufficient to confer a vested right.
Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177 (1910).
22. Injuries to privately owned structures and developments in the stream, however
closely approaching a destruction, are distinguished, however, from an appropriation for
use by the Government, as, for example, a dam. The servitude doctrine does not permit
confiscation for beneficial use. See, as a leading case, Monongahela Navig. Co. v. United
States, 148 U. S. 312 (1893).
23. Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U. S. 251 (1915). Plaintiff's wharf was
within a harbor line approved by the Secretary of War.
24. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 125 (1922).
25. Lewis Bluepoint Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82 (1913). Under
the holding, it is immaterial that state law vests title to the bed in the plaintiff.
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tion of the "bed of the stream" has generally been extended to include all lands
below "mean high water mark."2 0
Where changes in stream behavior, resulting from project developments,
impair the use of riparian or non-riparian land beyond the "natural bed,"
the courts no longer apply the servitude doctrine. But in actions against the
United States, the landowner bears the major burden of showing that, under
the Fifth Amendment, his property has been "taken," within the meaning
of the term as technically construed. Rooted in the concept of property as
the physical object of ownership, a narrow but ill-defined legal principle has
developed distinguishing between a "mere damaging" and a "taking." If the
impairment of use falls in the damaging category, recovery is precluded be-
cause the plaintiff's cause can no longer be classified as a contract action, even
though in similar suits between private parties a tort remedy is available.
But this theory of "consequential damages" has not been carried to such a
logical extreme as to require a complete appropriation and a taking of pos-
session by the Government. In a leading eminent domain case, Pumpclly v.
Green Bay Company,2 7 where land was totally submerged by overflow as
the result of the construction of a dam in aid of navigation, the Supreme
Court permitted recovery by refusing to "pervert the constitutional provision"
to require that the land be taken "in the narrowest sense of the word."2
Under the authority of the Pumpelly case, compensation has sometimes been
awarded even where the plaintiff is able to continue beneficial use of the land
damaged. 29
But, as a limitation on the Pumpelly case, the physical concept of property
has survived to the extent that later holdings require an actual invasion of
the real estate and such an impairment of land use as to amount to "a prac-
tical ouster of possession.&'30 A minority line of state decisions, 31 in inter-
preting state constitutional provisions similar to the Fifth Amendment, pointed
out the absurdity of this requirement, by recognizing that the failure to liber-
alize the property concept might lead to the undesirable construction that
26. Mfarret v. United States, 82 Ct. Cf. 1 (1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 545 (1936)
(recovery denied where heightening of a federal dam near Louisville permanently sub-
merged the first floor of plaintiff's hotel). Cf. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.
R. R., 113 F. (2d) 919 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
27. 23 Wall. 166 (U. S. 1871). Actually the Court construed a provision in the Con-
stitution of Wisconsin substantially identical with that of the Fifth amendment, but the
case has been long regarded as authority for similar holdings under the federal provision.
28. For similar holdings see United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316 (1917); United
States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445 (1903) ; Rose Island Co. v. United States, 46 F. (2d)
802 (W. D. Ky. 1930); Tompkins v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 66 (1910).
29. United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316 (1917); cf. Rose Island Co. v. United
States, 46 F. (2d) 802 (W. D. Ky. 1930).
30. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 642 (1878).
31. AMilhouse v. State Highway Dep't, 194 S. C. 33, 8 S. - (2d) 852 (1940) ; Mor-
rison v. Clackamas County, 141 Ore. 564, 18 P. (2d) 814 (1933). For a discussion of
early state decisions see Cormack, supra note 11.
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"No person shall be divested of the formal title to property without com-
pensation, but he may, without compensation, be deprived of all that makes
the title valuable."3 2 Nevertheless, federal courts continued to develop and
apply this property concept. Thus, the Supreme Court, on the grounds of
the absence of an actual invasion, has denied recovery to riparian owners of
land used principally as shipping points where access to the stream is cut
off by the construction of Government dykes or piers, reducing property
values'by half.33 Likewise, the impairment of drainage, however vital to the
particular land use, is insufficient for a successful suit.
3 4
Furthermore, even where the character of the injury appears to have all
the qualities of an actual invasion, and the plaintiff's land is completely washed
away, permanently or intermittently overflowed, or converted into the channel
bed of the stream, several other conceptual devices emerge to render his claim
uncertain. The court may find that the Government did not proximately
cause the injury35 or it may simply declare the damage "consequential" rather
than "direct." 36 In ascertaining proximate cause, the absence of temporal
or spacial remoteness has been emphasized. Where the washing away was
gradual, though complete, or where the tract was several miles distant from
the Government project, the necessary elements of a taking have been found
lacking.3 7 Intervening forces, such as freshets, have proved fatal although
the damage would not have occurred but for governmentally raised water
levels.3 8 The injury must also be reasonably predictable as a consequence of
Government action. The Supreme Court, in John Horstman Company v.
United States,39 assumed causal relation but defeated the action on the grounds
that the Government could not foresee the damage. This vague requirement,
that the damage be "direct" rather than "consequential," has sometimes led
to extreme holdings. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a recent decision
difficult to reconcile with the decisions in several other federal cases involving
similar facts, stressed the point that there was no direct encroachment on
private property because the structure erected by the Government did "at
no point touch upon appellants' land," although the deflected current of the
32. Mr. Justice Jeremiah Smith in Eaton v. B. C. & M. R. R., 51 N. H. 504 (1872).
33. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141 (1900); Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S.
269 (1897).
34. Lynn v. United States, 110 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940); Mills v. United
States, 46 Fed. 738 (S. D. Ga. 1891).
35. Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U. S. 146 (1924); Jackson v. United States,
230 U. S. 1 (1913); Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 217 (1904) ; Christman v.
United States, 74 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
36. Franklin v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939), aff'd on other
grounds, 308 U. S. 516 (1939) ; cf. United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316 (1917).
37. Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 217 (1904).
38. Christman v. United States, 74 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
39. 257 U. S. 138 (1921). The requirement of foreseeability appears to be closely
related to the requirement of intention to take as an element of the fictitious contract
on which the claim is founded.
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Mississippi had changed their tract into the channel bed. ° It has also been
frequently pointed out that recovery will be defeated where plaintiff's loss
can be mitigated by expenditures for protective engineering, as, for example,
the erection of a private levee or revetment.41
Apart from the deeply rooted conceptual difficulties confronting the indi-
vidual in suits against the Government, another factor militating against
recovery may be found, either expressly 42 or by implication,43 in the utili-
tarian philosophy of the courts in lending judicial aid to large scale social
undertakings. The flood control developments in the lower Mississippi, for
example, have given rise to litigation complicated with abundant political
and social implications" For the benefit of other owners, large areas of rich
alluvial farm lands in the river valley have been exposed to increased destruc-
tive floodwaters, but the fear of the prohibitive costs of acquiring flowage
easements led early to the legislative policy of avoiding all liability for damages,
within constitutional limitations. 43 In Jackson v. United States,40 the Missis-
sippi River Commission, pursuant to the Eads plan, had completed a broken
line of levees erected by the state and private individuals in order to confine
flood waters to the channel bed. A large class of owners were excluded from
levee protection, however, because the estimated construction costs for the
particular area exceeded the value of the flood damage to be averted.47 Al-
though it was necessary for inhabitants to abandon the area because of the
increased flood heights resulting from the construction of the completed levee
system, the Court excused the United States from liability on the Govern-
ment's argument that it had no duty to raise the plaintiff's levee. The Court
40. Franklin v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939). The Supreme
Court affirmed the decision, but on the grounds that the amount of the claim plus inter-
est exceeded $10,000, thus depriving the district court of jurisdiction under the Tudler
Act. 308 U. S. 516 (1939). Cf. United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316 (1917). See (1939)
52 HARv. L. Rlv. 1176; (1939) 25 VA. L. Rxv. 854; (1939) 18 N. C. L REv. 43; (1939)
24 IowA L. REv. 779 (all critical of the Franklin case).
41. Mfills v. United States, 46 Fed. 738 (S. D. Ga. 1891) ; see Manigault . Springs,
199 U. S. 473 (1905). The Mills case is frequently cited as the leading case limiting the
Pumpelly doctrine. See, for example, Lynn v. United States, 110 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A.
5th, 1940).
42. See Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 104 (1932) (suit to enjoin construction of
a floodway).
43. See United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U. S. 256 (1939).
44. The 'Mississippi River Committee has pointed out that the total cost to the
United States for flood damage in some of the floodw\ays would probably nearly equal
the present value of the lands themselves amounting to many millions of dollars. Fre.
Emm-RG. ADm. OF PuBLIc WoRcs, REPORT OF THE MISSISSIP' VALLEY Co.,.Trx (1934)
204.
45. See note 73 infra.
46. 230 U. S. 1 (1913).
47. The Flood Control Act of 1928, for the first time in the history of flood control
legislation, provided for the condemnation of lands along the banks of the Mississippi
excluded from levee protection. 45 STAT. 536 (1928) 33 U. S. C. § 702c (1934).
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assigned the cause of the injury to other levee builders as well as the United
States and, additionally, asserted the unqualified privilege of all riparian
owners, including the Government, to protect themselves from a vis 1najor.48
The passage of the Flood Control Act of 1928, providing for the diversion
of excess floodwaters into designated floodways, has created a yet unsolved
problem resulting from the fact that inhabitants in the paths of the diversion
channels are exposed to excess floodwaters for the benefit of the protected
areas.49 In the recent Sponenbarger 0 case, where an owner of land in Boeuf
Floodway sought compensation under the Tucker Act, the Supreme Court
reversed the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and denied recovery principally
because the record failed to show that the Government improvements had
increased the "immemorial danger of unpredictable major floods to which
respondent's land had always been subject." Although vast agricultural areas
were adequately protected from floods by the continued exposure of the flood-
way lands, the Court pointed out that the project as a whole increased plain-
tiff's protection against minor floods. The increased damages from excessive
floodwaters were held remote and speculative, although plaintiff contended
that the market value of his land had been seriously reduced.51 The flood
control cases,52 generally, pointedly illustrate the insufficiency of the land-
owner's action as a means of effecting economic adjustments of land use in
the floodways, particularly since the related problem of preventing further
settlement of the areas and forestalling the necessity of increased expenditures
for flood relief is involved.
In landowners' actions against the Government where the plaintiff has
satisfied all the requirements for recovery the final problem of ascertaining
the amount of compensation remains. The issue of valuation, although fre-
quently decided favorably to the landowner,5 3 is nevertheless open to objec-
tion because of its uncertainty. It becomes of greater significance because
present in condemnation suits as well as actions against the Government. In
48. For similar holdings see Cubbins v. Mississippi River Comm., 241 U. S. 351
(1916) ; Hughes v. United States, 230 U. S. 24 (1913).
49. See FED. EMERG. ADMI. OF PUBLIC WORKs, REPORT OF THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY
ComMIm (1934) 203-7.
50. United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U. S. 256 (1939).
51. The Flood Control Act of 1928 conferred discretion on the Secretary of War and
Chief of Engineers to acquire title to or flowage easements over floodway lands where
"needed in carrying out this project." 45 STAT. 536 (1928) 33 U. S, C. § 702d (1934).
Under the administrative policy adopted, flowage rights were acquired in only two of
the floodways where pre-existing protection was being reduced or eliminated by the
United States. In other floodway areas the excessive total cost of acquisition to the Gov-
ernment led to a contrary policy, and inhabitants were compelled to rely on actions against
the Government for compensation. See FED. E.MERG. AD.I. OF PUBLIC WoaRs, REPORT OF
THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY COMMITrEE (1934) 204.
52. See also Matthews v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 452 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) ; Mat-
thews v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 662 (1938).
53. See ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN (1936) § 237.
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arriving at a standard for determining the amount of an award the courts
have repeatedly defined "just compensation" as equal to the "value of the
property at the time of the taking."r- Any application of the concept of
value to specific parcels, however, necessarily has the triple aspect of value
to the taker, value to the owner, and value in the market.55 As between the
Government and the landowner it has been settled, at least in theory, that
the measure of compensation is "what has the owner lost, not what has the
taker gained." 6 The peculiar adaptability of the land for the taker's uses
has been declared irrelevant to the principle of indemnification for loss em-
bodied in the Fifth Amendment.F But the difficulty of translating into
monetary terms the special worth of a piece of land to a single individual
has led the courts to substitute for the indemnity principle the "market value"
or "fair market value" test,5s notwithstanding the fact fltat value to the
owner may often exceed materially the amount obtainable from prospective
purchasers in the community.
An objective application even of the market value test, however, is sub-
stantially precluded by the additional requirement that value be determined
as of "the time of the taking."59 At or immediately prior to the time of
actual taking, and often for a considerable period beforehand, actual market
value necessarily equals the estimated amount of the omer's claim against
the taker for a cash award. Frequently, the fact that an agency vested with
the power of eminent domain contemplates the appropriation of large areas
for the development of reservoirs has led to speculative trading in the local
real estate market.60 And, of course, where the water project is sufficiently
complete to threaten adjacent holdings with substantial damage, measures
of present market value are materially influenced by the owner's chances
of recovering compensation.01 In order to minimize circular reasoning, it is
apparent that the valuation standard established by the courts must be assumed
to mean the conjectural value of the property in a hypothetical market wherein
the prospects of an appropriation by the Government are eliminated. This
highly abstract criterion of appraisal has necessarily served as no more than
an inspiration for "fairness" to the tribunal making an actual determination
of the amount of an award. Frequently, the final figure is reached by taking
54. See Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 255 (1934).
55. See ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 53, §§ 12, 13, 14.
56. Mr. Justice Holmes in Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 1S9,
195 (1910).
57. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53 (1913). But see United
States v. Southern States Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 519 (IV. D. N. C. 1940).
58. Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1934); Mississippi & Rum River Boom
Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 (1878). The distinction between market value and value
to the owner, however, is not expressly recognized.
59. See cases cited supra notes 57 and 58.
60. See 1 BONBIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 414-5.
61. See ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 53, § 237.
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an arbitrary mean of the divergent estimates of several expert witnesses. 2
Other admissible evidence, however, includes cost value, rental value, sales
of similar lands, and, more rarely, bids and offers.0 3 Estimated profits deriv-
able from continued use of the land are generally excluded as speculative. 4
In the condemnation suit, as distinguished from the landowner's action
against the Government, the owner's prospects of obtaining compensation for
property injuries are substantially increased. The procedural difference in
the two types of suit has materially influenced the courts in finding sub-
stantive grounds of recovery. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
expressly held that in condemnation suits the Fifth Amendment affords relief
for lands "damaged" as well as those "taken."0 6, The fact that the Govern-
ment institutes suit pursuant to the power expressly or impliedly conferred
by the statute authorizing the particular project has proved especially valu-
able to owners who hold damaged lands other than the site which the Govern-
ment seeks to condemn. In a recent case decided by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, 6 the Government sought to condemn a small plot for
part of a dam site in the upper Mississippi. The defendant counterclaimed
and obtained compensation under the Tucker Act for overflow damage to
large upstream holdings. The court relied on the fact that the defendant
would be barred from recovery in a separate action and, under the authority
of United States v. Grizzard,67 allowed compensation because the use to which
the Government put the condemned parcel proximately caused the damage
to the other property. Although it is not difficult to agree with the court's
conclusion, the constitutional right to compensation would seem to be unre-
lated to the extent of holdings or the likelihood that the Government may
condemn another piece of land owned by the same party. Nevertheless, in
ascertaining the amount of compensation where only a part of a single tract
is condemned, the courts have similarly permitted recovery not only for
damages resulting from the separation, 8 but also for injury to the remaining
parcel caused by overflow or drainage impairment.60 In so doing, the rigid
62. See 1 BONBRIGHrT, op. cit. supra note 60, 426-7.
63. See Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 581 (1923); Loughran v.
United States, 64 F. (2d) 555 (App. D. C. 1933). See also OaRG, op. Cit. supra note
53, § 134 et seq.
64. United States v. Meyer, 113 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
65. United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 82 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936),
cert. denied, 298 U. S. 689 (1936).
66. United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 90 F. (2d) 161 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U. S. 714 (1937).
67. 219 U. S. 180 (1911).
68. For a holding that recoverable damages for the remaining parcel are exclusively
those resulting from its severance from the condemned parcel, see High Bridge Lumber
Co. v. United States, 69 Fed. 320 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895).
69. See, for example, United States v. Wabasha-Nelson Bridge Co., 83 F. (2d)
852 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 82 F. (2d) 131 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 689 (1936).
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requirements for a "taking" present in the landowner's action against the
Government are relaxed. Compensation for damages to the land not taken
are included in the award when the present value of the remaining part is
subtracted from the former value of the entire land to determine the total
amount of the judgmentY° Thus, the defendant recovers for a type of
damage unobtainable in independent proceedings.
In this light, it is clear that adequate compensation awards are more likely
to be obtained when the Government institutes the action. This means, of
course, that the ultimate responsibility for effecting the policy of distributing
the individual's loss among the public must rest with the legislative and
administrative authorities. In the development of water projects, the pre-
dominant legislative and administrative policy has in the past, been directed
toward avoiding federal responsibility for the acquisition of interests in land.7 1
Fear of the "prohibitive costs" of acquisition and doubts of the federal power
to condemn land without state consent led to statutory provisions denying
federal liability for "damages" and requiring the approval of state legisla-
tures for federal purchase of construction sites.72 Frequently, state and local
agencies were delegated the burden of providing all necessary lands, ease-
ments, and rights of way without cost and of saving the United States free
from damages due to construction.3 Negotiations for purchase by local au-
thorities familiar with land values were expected to secure property interests
at lower prices.74 But the Flood Control Act of 1938,rl providing for the
extensive construction of navigation, flood control, and power projects
throughout the nation marked a reversal of federal policy both with respect
to the acquisition of property interests and the operation and maintenance
of engineering units.7 6 In preliminary debate on the bill, Congress recognized
that the interstate character of multiple-purpose projects substantially pre-
cludes reliance on local initiative.77 A dam and reservoir located in one state
70. See United States v. Grizzard, 219 U. S. 180 (1911).
71. See FED. EmE-G. Amr'. OF PUBLIC WORKs, R.PORT OF THE lIssIssIpPI "VAUL"
Con'sr (1934) 25-9.
72. See 83 Cong. Rec. 9220 et seq. (1938). The power of the Federal Government
to acquire lands without state consent would seem to be beyond dispute since the deci-
sion in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937). See also Kohl v. United
States, 91 U. S. 367 (1875).
73. The Flood Control Act of 1936, for example, required as a condition precedent
to the appropriation of funds for the development of flood control, navigation and mul-
tiple-purpose projects assurances from states or local agencies that they would (a) pro-
vide without cost to the United States all necessary lands, easements, and rights of vy;
(b) save the United States free from damages due to the construction works; (c) main-
tain and operate all the works after completion. 49 STAT. 1571 (1936), 33 U. S. C. § 701c
(Supp. 1939).
74. See note 71 supra.
75. 52 STAT. 1215, 33 U. S. C. § 701c (Supp. 1939).
76. See Mills, The Job of Flood Control Passes to Washington (1939) 23 P. U.
FoRT. 67.
77. See 83 Cong. Rec. 9289 et seq. (1938).
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may be chiefly of benefit to downstream inhabitants beyond its jurisdiction.
Consequently, the responsibility of acquiring property rights and supervising
the operation of completed projects was vested in federal authorities.
A federal eminent domain policy disposed toward the making of compen-
sation awards is not, however, a final solution to the problem of readjusting
private interests affected by the development of water projects. The con-
demnation suit completes only half the process when it is necessary to regu-
late the use of land not retired from private ownership or when displaced
inhabitants do not have the resources to make an effective readjustment. As
forecast by scattered pieces of legislation,78 the criterion of fair compensation
may in the future appropriately be abandoned for the more economically sound
and financially expedient principle of substitution or "convenient reinstate-
ment." Where entire towns are threatened with inundation by a Government
reservoir, it is obvious that relocation of the town site and removal or recon-
struction of the buildings more adequately preserves private interests at less
cost than individual compensation awards. 70 For several reasons, in many
less rare situations relocation programs adopted by the authority and executed
in conjunction with the development of the project may more satisfactorily
accomplish a readjustment of private interests than the condemnation suit.
First, the necessity for employing the uncertain methods of evaluation present
in eminent domain proceedings may be avoided. In flood control legislation,
Congress has provided that highway, railway, and utility structures be re-
located rather than condemned, thus eliminating the difficult problem of
appraising their value in monetary terms.8 0
Secondly, in rural areas the compensation award, though unrelated in the
past to resettlement and rehabilitation, has now become an aspect of such
problems. A large proportion of the population affected by project develop-
ments are tenant farmers without financial means of relocation. Where they
have the status of lessees, the amount of compensation, based on the value of
their leasehold, is frequently reduced to a minimum because of short term
leases and prevailing low incomes; where lesser interests are held, as in
the case of the "sharecropper" of the South, no legal right to compensation
exists.8 ' In the already overcrowded agricultural regions of the Tennessee
78. The Flood Control Act of 1938 confers discretionary authority on the Chief of
Engineers to make expenditures for the evacuation of areas eliminated from flood pro-
tection and the rehabilitation of the persons so evacuated. 52 STAT. 1216 (1938), 33 U.
S. C. § 701-i (Supp. 1939). The Tennessee Valley Authority Act, as amended in 1935,
authorizes the TVA "to advise and cooperate in the readjustment of the population dis-
placed by the construction of dams, the acquisition of reservoir areas, the protection of
watersheds, . . . and other necessary acquisitions of land . . ." 49 STAT. 1080 (1935),
16 U. S. C. § 831c (Supp. 1939).
79. See note 3 supra.
80. 49 STAT. 1510 (1936), 33 U. S. C. §§ 702a-7, 702a-8 (Supp. 1939). 52 STAT.
1215 (1938), 33 U. S. C. §701c-1 (Supp. 1939).
81. See Book, A Note on the Legal Status of Share-Tenants and Share-Croppers in
the South (1937) 4 LAw & CONTMIP. PROB. 539.
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Valley, for example, local assistance through state agricultural agencies, and
federal aid, through the Resettlement Administration, have been necessary
to meet the significant problem of rehabilitating the large numbers of farm
families displaced from the reservoir areas of the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority.8 2 Whether the source of aid is state or federal, some form is desir-
able in order to prevent increases in relief rolls.
Finally, relocation programs may be integrated into broader programs of
regional land-use planning. The intimate relationship between agricultural
practices and the conservation of water resources has been widely recog-
nized.8 3 Legislative measures to prevent soil erosion and retard water run-off
have been adopted as part of the national flood control program.84 Where
it is necessary for farmers to resettle through governmentally extended "re-
habilitation loans" the region-wide benefits from proper agricultural practices
may be secured through terms in the loan agreement.8s Areas purchased
by the Government for the protection of reservoirs from the accumulation
of silt have been and may, more extensively, be leased under controlled con-
ditions of agriculture.8 6 The Mississippi River Committee, in suggesting
methods of meeting the problem of flood damages in the floodways, has recom-
mended as feasible a plan by which the Government purchases all lands in
the areas and leases them for agricultural or forestry uses compatible with
flood conditions.8 7 From these diverse methods, and the possibilities they
suggest, of coordinating land use with water control developments, it becomes
apparent that the social problem of protecting the individual from loss may
become an opportunity for constructive planning of the use of land in the
river valleys.
82. See Satterfield, Removal of Families from Tennessee Valley Authority Reservoir
Areas (1937) 16 SocLAL FoRcEs 258.
83. See NAT. RES. Comm., DRAINAGE BASIN PROBLE S AND PaoGAsS (1938).
84. 52 STAT. 1225 (1938), 33 U. S. C. § 701b-l (Supp. 1939).
85. See Oppenheimer, The Development of the Rural Rehabilitation Loan Program
(1937) 4 LAW & CoNTrEmP. PROB. 473.
86. See 6 REP. TVA (1939) 89-91.
87. FED. Emaas. AD,. OF PuiLic WORKS, REPORT OF THE MxssIssPPI VALLEY
Com-TTEE (1934) 204-207.
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